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Abstract
Traditional approaches to differential privacy assume a fixed privacy requirement
ε for a computation, and attempt to maximize the accuracy of the computation
subject to the privacy constraint. As differential privacy is increasingly deployed in
practical settings, it may often be that there is instead a fixed accuracy requirement
for a given computation and the data analyst would like to maximize the privacy of
the computation subject to the accuracy constraint. This raises the question of how
to find and run a maximally private empirical risk minimizer subject to a given
accuracy requirement. We propose a general “noise reduction” framework that
can apply to a variety of private empirical risk minimization (ERM) algorithms,
using them to “search” the space of privacy levels to find the empirically strongest
one that meets the accuracy constraint, and incurring only logarithmic overhead
in the number of privacy levels searched. The privacy analysis of our algorithm
leads naturally to a version of differential privacy where the privacy parameters
are dependent on the data, which we term ex-post privacy, and which is related
to the recently introduced notion of privacy odometers. We also give an ex-post
privacy analysis of the classical AboveThreshold privacy tool, modifying it to allow
for queries chosen depending on the database. Finally, we apply our approach to
two common objective functions, regularized linear and logistic regression, and
empirically compare our noise reduction methods to (i) inverting the theoretical
utility guarantees of standard private ERM algorithms and (ii) a stronger, empirical
baseline based on binary search.1
1 Introduction and Related Work
Differential Privacy [7, 8] enjoys over a decade of study as a theoretical construct, and a much more
recent set of large-scale practical deployments, including by Google [10] and Apple [11]. As the large
theoretical literature is put into practice, we start to see disconnects between assumptions implicit
in the theory and the practical necessities of applications. In this paper we focus our attention on
one such assumption in the domain of private empirical risk minimization (ERM): that the data
analyst first chooses a privacy requirement, and then attempts to obtain the best accuracy guarantee
(or empirical performance) that she can, given the chosen privacy constraint. Existing theory is
tailored to this view: the data analyst can pick her privacy parameter ε via some exogenous process,
and either plug it into a “utility theorem” to upper bound her accuracy loss, or simply deploy her
algorithm and (privately) evaluate its performance. There is a rich and substantial literature on private
convex ERM that takes this approach, weaving tight connections between standard mechanisms in
1A full version of this paper appears on the arXiv preprint site: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10829.
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differential privacy and standard tools for empirical risk minimization. These methods for private
ERM include output and objective perturbation [5, 14, 18, 4], covariance perturbation [19], the
exponential mechanism [16, 2], and stochastic gradient descent [2, 21, 12, 6, 20].
While these existing algorithms take a privacy-first perspective, in practice, product requirements
may impose hard accuracy constraints, and privacy (while desirable) may not be the over-riding
concern. In such situations, things are reversed: the data analyst first fixes an accuracy requirement,
and then would like to find the smallest privacy parameter consistent with the accuracy constraint.
Here, we find a gap between theory and practice. The only theoretically sound method available is to
take a “utility theorem” for an existing private ERM algorithm and solve for the smallest value of
ε (the differential privacy parameter)—and other parameter values that need to be set—consistent
with her accuracy requirement, and then run the private ERM algorithm with the resulting ε. But
because utility theorems tend to be worst-case bounds, this approach will generally be extremely
conservative, leading to a much larger value of ε (and hence a much larger leakage of information)
than is necessary for the problem at hand. Alternately, the analyst could attempt an empirical search
for the smallest value of ε consistent with her accuracy goals. However, because this search is itself
a data-dependent computation, it incurs the overhead of additional privacy loss. Furthermore, it is
not a priori clear how to undertake such a search with nontrivial privacy guarantees for two reasons:
first, the worst case could involve a very long search which reveals a large amount of information,
and second, the selected privacy parameter is now itself a data-dependent quantity, and so it is not
sensible to claim a “standard” guarantee of differential privacy for any finite value of ε ex-ante.
In this paper, we provide a principled variant of this second approach, which attempts to empirically
find the smallest value of ε consistent with an accuracy requirement. We give a meta-method that
can be applied to several interesting classes of private learning algorithms and introduces very little
privacy overhead as a result of the privacy-parameter search. Conceptually, our meta-method initially
computes a very private hypothesis, and then gradually subtracts noise (making the computation less
and less private) until a sufficient level of accuracy is achieved. One key technique that significantly
reduces privacy loss over naive search is the use of correlated noise generated by the method of [15],
which formalizes the conceptual idea of “subtracting” noise without incurring additional privacy
overhead. In order to select the most private of these queries that meets the accuracy requirement, we
introduce a natural modification of the now-classic AboveThreshold algorithm [8], which iteratively
checks a sequence of queries on a dataset and privately releases the index of the first to approximately
exceed some fixed threshold. Its privacy cost increases only logarithmically with the number of
queries. We provide an analysis of AboveThreshold that holds even if the queries themselves are
the result of differentially private computations, showing that if AboveThreshold terminates after t
queries, one only pays the privacy costs of AboveThreshold plus the privacy cost of revealing those
first t private queries. When combined with the above-mentioned correlated noise technique of [15],
this gives an algorithm whose privacy loss is equal to that of the final hypothesis output – the previous
ones coming “for free” – plus the privacy loss of AboveThreshold. Because the privacy guarantees
achieved by this approach are not fixed a priori, but rather are a function of the data, we introduce
and apply a new, corresponding privacy notion, which we term ex-post privacy, and which is closely
related to the recently introduced notion of “privacy odometers” [17].
In Section 4, we empirically evaluate our noise reduction meta-method, which applies to any ERM
technique which can be described as a post-processing of the Laplace mechanism. This includes both
direct applications of the Laplace mechanism, like output perturbation [5]; and more sophisticated
methods like covariance perturbation [19], which perturbs the covariance matrix of the data and
then performs an optimization using the noisy data. Our experiments concentrate on `2 regularized
least-squares regression and `2 regularized logistic regression, and we apply our noise reduction
meta-method to both output perturbation and covariance perturbation. Our empirical results show
that the active, ex-post privacy approach massively outperforms inverting the theory curve, and also
improves on a baseline “ε-doubling” approach.
2 Privacy Background and Tools
2.1 Differential Privacy and Ex-Post Privacy
Let X denote the data domain. We call two datasets D,D′ ∈ X ∗ neighbors (written as D ∼ D′) if
D can be derived from D′ by replacing a single data point with some other element of X .
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Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [7]). Fix ε ≥ 0. A randomized algorithm A : X ∗ → O is
ε-differentially private if for every pair of neighboring data sets D ∼ D′ ∈ X ∗, and for every event
S ⊆ O:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[A(D′) ∈ S].
We call exp(ε) the privacy risk factor.
It is possible to design computations that do not satisfy the differential privacy definition, but whose
outputs are private to an extent that can be quantified after the computation halts. For example,
consider an experiment that repeatedly runs an ε′-differentially private algorithm, until a stopping
condition defined by the output of the algorithm itself is met. This experiment does not satisfy
ε-differential privacy for any fixed value of ε, since there is no fixed maximum number of rounds
for which the experiment will run (for a fixed number of rounds, a simple composition theorem,
Theorem 2.5, shows that the ε-guarantees in a sequence of computations “add up.”) However, if ex-
post we see that the experiment has stopped after k rounds, the data can in some sense be assured an
“ex-post privacy loss” of only kε′. Rogers et al. [17] initiated the study of privacy odometers, which
formalize this idea. They study privacy composition when the data analyst can choose the privacy
parameters of subsequent computations as a function of the outcomes of previous computations.
We apply a related idea here, for a different purpose. Our goal is to design one-shot algorithms that
always achieve a target accuracy but that may have variable privacy levels depending on their input.
Definition 2.2. Given a randomized algorithm A : X ∗ → O, define the ex-post privacy loss2 of A
on outcome o to be
Loss(o) = max
D,D′:D∼D′
log
Pr [A(D) = o]
Pr [A(D′) = o] .
We refer to exp (Loss(o)) as the ex-post privacy risk factor.
Definition 2.3 (Ex-Post Differential Privacy). Let E : O → (R≥0 ∪ {∞}) be a function on the
outcome space of algorithm A : X ∗ → O. Given an outcome o = A(D), we say that A satisfies
E(o)-ex-post differential privacy if for all o ∈ O, Loss(o) ≤ E(o).
Note that if E(o) ≤ ε for all o, A is ε-differentially private. Ex-post differential privacy has the
same semantics as differential privacy, once the output of the mechanism is known: it bounds the
log-likelihood ratio of the dataset being D vs. D′, which controls how an adversary with an arbitrary
prior on the two cases can update her posterior.
2.2 Differential Privacy Tools
Differentially private computations enjoy two nice properties:
Theorem 2.4 (Post Processing [7]). Let A : X ∗ → O be any ε-differentially private algorithm, and
let f : O → O′ be any function. Then the algorithm f ◦A : X ∗ → O′ is also ε-differentially private.
Post-processing implies that, for example, every decision process based on the output of a differen-
tially private algorithm is also differentially private.
Theorem 2.5 (Composition [7]). Let A1 : X ∗ → O, A2 : X ∗ → O′ be algorithms that are
ε1- and ε2-differentially private, respectively. Then the algorithm A : X ∗ → O × O′ defined as
A(x) = (A1(x), A2(x)) is (ε1 + ε2)-differentially private.
The composition theorem holds even if the composition is adaptive—-see [9] for details.
The Laplace mechanism. The most basic subroutine we will use is the Laplace mechanism. The
Laplace Distribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density function
Lap (z|b) = 12be−
|z|
b . We say X ∼ Lap (b) when X has Laplace distribution with scale b. Let
f : X ∗ → Rd be an arbitrary d-dimensional function. The `1 sensitivity of f is defined to be
∆1(f) = maxD∼D′ ‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1. The Laplace mechanism with parameter ε simply adds noise
drawn independently from Lap
(
∆1(f)
ε
)
to each coordinate of f(x).
2IfA’s output is from a continuous distribution rather than discrete, we abuse notation and write Pr[A(D) =
o] to mean the probability density at output o.
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Theorem 2.6 ([7]). The Laplace mechanism is ε-differentially private.
Gradual private release. Koufogiannis et al. [15] study how to gradually release private data using
the Laplace mechanism with an increasing sequence of ε values, with a privacy cost scaling only with
the privacy of the marginal distribution on the least private release, rather than the sum of the privacy
costs of independent releases. For intuition, the algorithm can be pictured as a continuous random
walk starting at some private data v with the property that the marginal distribution at each point in
time is Laplace centered at v, with variance increasing over time. Releasing the value of the random
walk at a fixed point in time gives a certain output distribution, for example, vˆ, with a certain privacy
guarantee ε. To produce vˆ′ whose ex-ante distribution has higher variance (is more private), one can
simply “fast forward” the random walk from a starting point of vˆ to reach vˆ′; to produce a less private
vˆ′, one can “rewind.” The total privacy cost is max{ε, ε′} because, given the “least private” point
(say vˆ), all “more private” points can be derived as post-processings given by taking a random walk
of a certain length starting at vˆ. Note that were the Laplace random variables used for each release
independent, the composition theorem would require summing the ε values of all releases.
In our private algorithms, we will use their noise reduction mechanism as a building block to generate
a list of private hypotheses θ1, . . . , θT with gradually increasing ε values. Importantly, releasing any
prefix (θ1, . . . , θt) only incurs the privacy loss in θt. More formally:
Algorithm 1 Noise Reduction [15]: NR(v,∆, {εt})
Input: private vector v, sensitivity parameter ∆, list ε1 < ε2 < · · · < εT
Set vˆT := v + Lap (∆/εT ) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate
for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1 do
With probability
(
εt
εt+1
)2
: set vˆt := vˆt+1
Else: set vˆt := vˆt+1 + Lap (∆/εt) . drawn i.i.d. for each coordinate
Return vˆ1, . . . , vˆT
Theorem 2.7 ([15]). Let f have `1 sensitivity ∆ and let vˆ1, . . . , vˆT be the output of Algorithm 1 on
v = f(D), ∆, and the increasing list ε1, . . . , εT . Then for any t, the algorithm which outputs the
prefix (vˆ1, . . . , vˆt) is εt-differentially private.
2.3 AboveThreshold with Private Queries
Our high-level approach to our eventual ERM problem will be as follows: Generate a sequence
of hypotheses θ1, . . . , θT , each with increasing accuracy and decreasing privacy; then test their
accuracy levels sequentially, outputting the first one whose accuracy is “good enough.” The classical
AboveThreshold algorithm [8] takes in a dataset and a sequence of queries and privately outputs the
index of the first query to exceed a given threshold (with some error due to noise). We would like to
use AboveThreshold to perform these accuracy checks, but there is an important obstacle: for us, the
“queries” themselves depend on the private data.3 A standard composition analysis would involve first
privately publishing all the queries, then running AboveThreshold on these queries (which are now
public). Intuitively, though, it would be much better to generate and publish the queries one at a time,
until AboveThreshold halts, at which point one would not publish any more queries. The problem
with analyzing this approach is that, a-priori, we do not know when AboveThreshold will terminate;
to address this, we analyze the ex-post privacy guarantee of the algorithm.4
Let us say that an algorithm M(D) = (f1, . . . , fT ) is (ε1, . . . , εT )-prefix-private if for each t, the
function that runs M(D) and outputs just the prefix (f1, . . . , ft) is εt-differentially private.
Lemma 2.8. Let M : X ∗ → (X ∗ → O)T be a (ε1, . . . , εT )-prefix private algorithm that returns T
queries, and let each query output by M have `1 sensitivity at most ∆. Then Algorithm 2 run on D,
εA, W , ∆, and M is E-ex-post differentially private for E((t, ·)) = εA + εt for any t ∈ [T ].
3In fact, there are many applications beyond our own in which the sequence of queries input to AboveThresh-
old might be the result of some private prior computation on the data, and where we would like to release both the
stopping index of AboveThreshold and the “query object.” (In our case, the query objects will be parameterized
by learned hypotheses θ1, . . . , θT .)
4This result does not follow from a straightforward application of privacy odometers from [17], because the
privacy analysis of algorithms like the noise reduction technique is not compositional.
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Algorithm 2 InteractiveAboveThreshold: IAT(D, ε,W,∆,M)
Input: Dataset D, privacy loss ε, threshold W , `1 sensitivity ∆, algorithm M
Let Wˆ = W + Lap
(
2∆
ε
)
for each query t = 1, . . . , T do
Query ft ←M(D)t
if ft(D) + Lap
(
4∆
ε
) ≥ Wˆ : then Output (t, ft); Halt.
Output (T , ⊥).
The proof, which is a variant on the proof of privacy for AboveThreshold [8], appears in the full
version, along with an accuracy theorem for IAT.
3 Noise-Reduction with Private ERM
In this section, we provide a general private ERM framework that allows us to approach the best
privacy guarantee achievable on the data given a target excess risk goal. Throughout the section,
we consider an input dataset D that consists of n row vectors X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∈ Rp and a column
y ∈ Rn. We will assume that each ‖Xi‖1 ≤ 1 and |yi| ≤ 1. Let di = (Xi, yi) ∈ Rp+1 be the i-th
data record. Let ` be a loss function such that for any hypothesis θ and any data point (Xi, yi) the loss
is `(θ, (Xi, yi)). Given an input dataset D and a regularization parameter λ, the goal is to minimize
the following regularized empirical loss function over some feasible set C:
L(θ,D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, (Xi, yi)) +
λ
2
‖θ‖22.
Let θ∗ = argminθ∈C `(θ,D). Given a target accuracy parameter α, we wish to privately compute a
θp that satisfies L(θp, D) ≤ L(θ∗, D) + α, while achieving the best ex-post privacy guarantee. For
simplicity, we will sometimes write L(θ) for L(θ,D).
One simple baseline approach is a “doubling method”: Start with a small ε value, run an ε-
differentially private algorithm to compute a hypothesis θ and use the Laplace mechanism to estimate
the excess risk of θ; if the excess risk is lower than the target, output θ; otherwise double the value of
ε and repeat the same process. (See the full version for details.) As a result, we pay for privacy loss
for every hypothesis we compute and every excess risk we estimate.
In comparison, our meta-method provides a more cost-effective way to select the privacy level. The
algorithm takes a more refined set of privacy levels ε1 < . . . < εT as input and generates a sequence
of hypotheses θ1, . . . , θT such that the generation of each θt is εt-private. Then it releases the
hypotheses θt in order, halting as soon as a released hypothesis meets the accuracy goal. Importantly,
there are two key components that reduce the privacy loss in our method:
1. We use Algorithm 1, the “noise reduction” method of [15], for generating the sequence of
hypotheses: we first compute a very private and noisy θ1, and then obtain the subsequent
hypotheses by gradually “de-noising” θ1. As a result, any prefix (θ1, . . . , θk) incurs a
privacy loss of only εk (as opposed to (ε1 + . . .+ εk) if the hypotheses were independent).
2. When evaluating the excess risk of each hypothesis, we use Algorithm 2, Interactive-
AboveThreshold, to determine if its excess risk exceeds the target threshold. This incurs
substantially less privacy loss than independently evaluating the excess risk of each hypothe-
sis using the Laplace mechanism (and hence allows us to search a finer grid of values).
For the rest of this section, we will instantiate our method concretely for two ERM problems: ridge
regression and logistic regression. In particular, our noise-reduction method is based on two private
ERM algorithms: the recently introduced covariance perturbation technique [19] and the output
perturbation method [5].
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3.1 Covariance Perturbation for Ridge Regression
In ridge regression, we consider the squared loss function: `((Xi, yi), θ) = 12 (yi − 〈θ,Xi〉)2, and
hence empirical loss over the data set is defined as
L(θ,D) =
1
2n
‖y −Xθ‖22 +
λ‖θ‖22
2
,
where X denotes the (n× p) matrix with row vectors X1, . . . , Xn and y = (y1, . . . , yn). Since the
optimal solution for the unconstrained problem has `2 norm no more than
√
1/λ (see the full version
for a proof), we will focus on optimizing θ over the constrained set C = {a ∈ Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
1/λ},
which will be useful for bounding the `1 sensitivity of the empirical loss.
Before we formally introduce the covariance perturbation algorithm due to [19], observe that the
optimal solution θ∗ can be computed as
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈C
L(θ,D) = argmin
θ∈C
(θᵀ(XᵀX)θ − 2〈Xᵀy, θ〉)
2n
+
λ‖θ‖22
2
.
In other words, θ∗ only depends on the private data through Xᵀy and XᵀX . To compute a private
hypothesis, the covariance perturbation method simply adds Laplace noise to each entry of Xᵀy and
XᵀX (the covariance matrix), and solves the optimization based on the noisy matrix and vector. The
formal description of the algorithm and its guarantee are in Theorem 3.1. Our analysis differs from
the one in [19] in that their paper considers the “local privacy” setting, and also adds Gaussian noise
whereas we use Laplace. The proof is deferred to the full version.
Theorem 3.1. Fix any ε > 0. For any input data set D, consider the mechanismM that computes
θp = argmin
θ∈C
1
2n
(θᵀ(XᵀX +B)θ − 2〈Xᵀy + b, θ〉) + λ‖θ‖
2
2
2
,
where B ∈ Rp×p and b ∈ Rp×1 are random Laplace matrices such that each entry of B and b is
drawn from Lap (4/ε). ThenM satisfies ε-differential privacy and the output θp satisfies
E
B,b
[L(θp)− L(θ∗)] ≤ 4
√
2(2
√
p/λ+ p/λ)
nε
.
In our algorithm COVNR, we will apply the noise reduction method, Algorithm 1, to produce a
sequence of noisy versions of the private data (XᵀX,Xᵀy): (Z1, z1), . . . , (ZT , zT ), one for each
privacy level. Then for each (Zt, zt), we will compute the private hypothesis by solving the noisy
version of the optimization problem in Equation (1). The full description of our algorithm COVNR is
in Algorithm 3, and satisfies the following guarantee:
Theorem 3.2. The instantiation of COVNR(D, {ε1, . . . , εT }, α, γ) outputs a hypothesis θp that with
probability 1− γ satisfies L(θp)− L(θ∗) ≤ α. Moreover, it is E-ex-post differentially private, where
the privacy loss function E : (([T ] ∪ {⊥})×Rp)→ (R≥0 ∪ {∞}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = ε0 + εk
for any k 6=⊥, E((⊥, ·)) =∞, and
ε0 =
16(
√
1/λ+ 1)2 log(2T/γ)
nα
is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
3.2 Output Perturbation for Logistic Regression
Next, we show how to combine the output perturbation method with noise reduction for the
ridge regression problem.5 In this setting, the input data consists of n labeled examples
(X1, y1), . . . , (Xn, yn), such that for each i, Xi ∈ Rp, ‖Xi‖1 ≤ 1, and yi ∈ {−1, 1}. The goal is to
train a linear classifier given by a weight vector θ for the examples from the two classes. We consider
the logistic loss function: `(θ, (Xi, yi)) = log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)), and the empirical loss is
L(θ,D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yiθᵀXi)) + λ‖θ‖
2
2
2
.
5We study the ridge regression problem for concreteness. Our method works for any ERM problem with
strongly convex loss functions.
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Algorithm 3 Covariance Perturbation with Noise-Reduction: COVNR(D, {ε1, . . . , εT }, α, γ)
Input: private data set D = (X, y), accuracy parameter α, privacy levels ε1 < ε2 < . . . < εT ,
and failure probability γ
Instantiate InteractiveAboveThreshold: A = IAT(D, ε0,−α/2,∆, ·) with ε0 =
16∆(log(2T/γ))/α and ∆ = (
√
1/λ+ 1)2/(n)
Let C = {a ∈ Rp | ‖a‖2 ≤
√
1/λ} and θ∗ = argminθ∈C L(θ)
Compute noisy data:
{Zt} = NR((XᵀX), 2, {ε1/2, . . . , εT /2}), {zt} = NR((XᵀY ), 2, {ε1/2, . . . , εT /2})
for t = 1, . . . , T : do
θt = argmin
θ∈C
1
2n
(
θᵀZtθ − 2〈zt, θ〉)+ λ‖θ‖22
2
(1)
Let f t(D) = L(θ∗, D)− L(θt, D); Query A with query f t to check accuracy
if A returns (t, f t) then Output (t, θt) . Accurate hypothesis found.
Output: (⊥, θ∗)
The output perturbation method simply adds Laplace noise to perturb each coordinate of the optimal
solution θ∗. The following is the formal guarantee of output perturbation. Our analysis deviates
slightly from the one in [5] since we are adding Laplace noise (see the full version).
Theorem 3.3. Fix any ε > 0. Let r = 2
√
p
nλε . For any input dataset D, consider the mechanism that
first computes θ∗ = argminθ∈Rp L(θ), then outputs θp = θ
∗ + b, where b is a random vector with its
entries drawn i.i.d. from Lap (r). ThenM satisfies ε-differential privacy, and θp has excess risk
E
b
[L(θp)− L(θ∗)] ≤ 2
√
2p
nλε
+
4p2
n2λε2
.
Given the output perturbation method, we can simply apply the noise reduction method NR to the
optimal hypothesis θ∗ to generate a sequence of noisy hypotheses. We will again use Interactive-
AboveThreshold to check the excess risk of the hypotheses. The full algorithm OUTPUTNR follows
the same structure in Algorithm 3, and we defer the formal description to the full version.
Theorem 3.4. The instantiation of OUTPUTNR(D, ε0, {ε1, . . . , εT }, α, γ) is E-ex-post differentially
private and outputs a hypothesis θp that with probability 1− γ satisfies L(θp)− L(θ∗) ≤ α, where
the privacy loss function E : (([T ] ∪ {⊥})×Rp)→ (R≥0 ∪ {∞}) is defined as E((k, ·)) = ε0 + εk
for any k 6=⊥, E((⊥, ·)) =∞, and
ε0 ≤ 32 log(2T/γ)
√
2 log 2/λ
nα
is the privacy loss incurred by IAT.
Proof sketch of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4. The accuracy guarantees for both algorithms follow from an
accuracy guarantee of the IAT algorithm (a variant on the standard AboveThreshold bound) and
the fact that we output θ∗ if IAT identifies no accurate hypothesis. For the privacy guarantee, first
note that any prefix of the noisy hypotheses θ1, . . . , θt satisfies εt-differential privacy because of
our instantiation of the Laplace mechanism (see the full version for the `1 sensitivity analysis) and
noise-reduction method NR. Then the ex-post privacy guarantee directly follows Lemma 2.8.
4 Experiments
To evaluate the methods described above, we conducted empirical evaluations in two settings. We
used ridge regression to predict (log) popularity of posts on Twitter in the dataset of [1], with p = 77
features and subsampled to n =100,000 data points. Logistic regression was applied to classifying
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Figure 1: Ex-post privacy loss. (1a) and (1c), left, represent ridge regression on the Twitter dataset,
where Noise Reduction and DOUBLINGMETHOD both use Covariance Perturbation. (1b) and (1d),
right, represent logistic regression on the KDD-99 Cup dataset, where both Noise Reduction and
DOUBLINGMETHOD use Output Perturbation. The top plots compare Noise Reduction to the “theory
approach”: running the algorithm once using the value of ε that guarantees the desired expected
error via a utility theorem. The bottom compares to the DOUBLINGMETHOD baseline. Note the top
plots are generous to the theory approach: the theory curves promise only expected error, whereas
Noise Reduction promises a high probability guarantee. Each point is an average of 80 trials (Twitter
dataset) or 40 trials (KDD-99 dataset).
network events as innocent or malicious in the KDD-99 Cup dataset [13], with 38 features and
subsampled to 100,000 points. Details of parameters and methods appear in the full version.6
In each case, we tested the algorithm’s average ex-post privacy loss for a range of input accuracy goals
α, fixing a modest failure probability γ = 0.1 (and we observed that excess risks were concentrated
well below α/2, suggesting a pessimistic analysis). The results show our meta-method gives a
large improvement over the “theory” approach of simply inverting utility theorems for private ERM
algorithms. (In fact, the utility theorem for the popular private stochastic gradient descent algorithm
does not even give meaningful guarantees for the ranges of parameters tested; one would need an
order of magnitude more data points, and even then the privacy losses are enormous, perhaps due to
loose constants in the analysis.)
To gauge the more modest improvement over DOUBLINGMETHOD, note that the variation in the
privacy risk factor eε can still be very large; for instance, in the ridge regression setting of α = 0.05,
6 A full implementation of our algorithms appears at: https://github.com/steven7woo/
Accuracy-First-Differential-Privacy.
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Noise Reduction has eε ≈ 10.0 while DOUBLINGMETHOD has eε ≈ 495; at α = 0.075, the privacy
risk factors are 4.65 and 56.6 respectively.
Interestingly, for our meta-method, the contribution to privacy loss from “testing” hypotheses (the
InteractiveAboveThreshold technique) was significantly larger than that from “generating” them
(NoiseReduction). One place where the InteractiveAboveThreshold analysis is loose is in using a
theoretical bound on the maximum norm of any hypothesis to compute the sensitivity of queries.
The actual norms of hypotheses tested was significantly lower which, if taken as guidance to the
practitioner in advance, would drastically improve the privacy guarantee of both adaptive methods.
5 Future Directions
Throughout this paper, we focus on ε-differential privacy, instead of the weaker (ε, δ)-(approximate)
differential privacy. Part of the reason is that an analogue of Lemma 2.8 does not seem to hold for
(ε, δ)-differentially private queries without further assumptions, as the necessity to union-bound over
the δ “failure probability” that the privacy loss is bounded for each query can erase the ex-post gains.
We leave obtaining similar results for approximate differential privacy as an open problem. More
generally, we wish to extend our ex-post privacy framework to approximate differential privacy, or
to the stronger notion of concentrated differential privacy [3]. Such results will allow us to obtain
ex-post privacy guarantees for a much broader class of algorithms.
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